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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the historical relation between conflict and land 
tenure in Rwanda, a country that experienced a harsh civil war and genocide in the mid-1990s. 
The victory of the Tutsi-led rebel, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) at that time triggered a 
massive return of refugees and a drastic change in land tenure policy. These were refugees who 
had fled the country at around the time of independence, in 1962, due to the political turmoil 
and persecution (the “social revolution”) and who shared the background of the core RPF 
members. The social revolution had dismantled the existent Tutsi-led political order, 
compelling many Tutsi families to seek refuge outside their homeland. Under the 
post-independence rule of a Hutu-led government, the Tutsi refugees were not allowed to 
return and the lands they left behind were often arbitrarily distributed by local authorities 
among Hutu peasants. After victory in the mid-1990s civil war, the newly established RPF-led 
government ordered the current inhabitants of the lands to divide the properties in order to 
allocate portions to the Tutsi returnees. Different patterns of land holding and land division will 
be explained in the paper from data gathered through the authors’ fieldworks in the southern 
and eastern parts of Rwanda. Although overt resistance to land division has not been observed 
to date, the land rights of the Tutsi returnees must be considered unstable because their 
legitimacy depends primarily on the strength and political stability of the RPF-led government. 
If the authority of RPF were to weaken, the land rights will be jeopardized. Throughout 
Rwandan history, in which political exclusion has often led to serious conflict, macro-level 
politics have repeatedly influenced land holding. Promotion of an inclusive democracy, 
therefore, is indispensable to escape the vicious circle between political instability and land 
rights. 
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Introduction 
Problems that revolve around land tenure have been much discussed in the field of 
political science due to the strong influence it exerts on political systems. In particular, how a 
land tenure system relates to political action and to political structure has been of interest to 
many scholars1. In the discussions, it has generally been assumed that land tenure systems are 
unlikely to change in the short term. Such an assumption is understandable in view of the long 
historical processes through which land tenure structures have been formed. 
However, we have observed numerous political events that have precipitated abrupt 
changes in land tenure systems. Armed conflict is one such event. Historically, the victors of 
war occupy their opponents’ land, sometimes expelling them in the process2. Recently, as most 
armed conflicts globally have shifted to internal disputes (Holsti 1996), their effects on land 
tenure have become more complex, requiring careful observation and research. This issue 
warrants serious study as it will necessarily influence the peace building and state building 
processes which are among the most important challenges facing many post-war African 
countries. 
This paper deals specifically with the experience of Rwanda, where harsh civil war 
and genocide occurred in the 1990s. Despite widespread academic attention to the Rwandan 
civil war and genocide, research on the influence of these events on land tenure has been 
sparse. The lack of research is all the more regrettable because the civil war has had such an 
enormous impact as to indelibly influence the Rwandan post-war political economy. 
Examining how the structure of Rwanda’s land tenure changed and why such change occurred 
is very important in order to fill the gap in understanding and to inform an appropriate policy 
                                                 
1 This has been a classical problem for the class analysis of Marxism. K. Marx’s The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon is a good example. The interest and methodology was inherited in part by 
macro political analysts such as Moore (1966) and Scott (1976).  
2 For instance, due to its defeat in World War II, Japan lost territories as well as former colonies. A 
tremendous number of Japanese were expelled from areas such as former Manchuria, the Korean 
Peninsula, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and Taiwan. Millions of Japanese rushed back to the homeland 
in the period 1946 to 1950. Similarly, the German defeat in World War II caused a loss of its territories 
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agenda for land rights stabilization. Change in land tenure will be discussed in this paper on the 
basis of fieldwork. It will be argued that as a consequence of the 1990s civil war, those people 
who share the background of the war victors acquired land through a radical land division 
process. 
Researchers have tended to consider land scarcity as a possible causal factor in the 
Rwandan genocide (André and Platteau 1996; Uvin 1998). Although a simple Malthusian 
explanation is unconvincing3, it is true that during the 1994 genocide the political elite tried to 
incite ordinary peasants by insisting that lands held by Tutsi families would be redistributed 
once they had been killed. This became one of the rationales to justify the killing (Straus 2006, 
165). In other words, land in Rwanda was politicized in the civil war and used as a tool for 
demagogic mobilization. Historical analysis is necessary to understand such a phenomenon. 
This is especially true in the case of Rwanda because it has experienced two waves of serious 
conflict in its recent history: turmoil around independence (the social revolution); and the civil 
war and genocide of the 1990s. Consequences of the former conflict strongly influenced the 
latter. This paper will show that the two upheavals were connected through refugees and land. 
The authors begin by explaining their methodology, especially regarding fieldwork 
(Section 1). They then discuss the pre-colonial and colonial background of Rwandan land 
tenure (Section 2). The third section describes, from the macro viewpoint, how the Rwandan 
civil war and the massive flux of refugees and returnees have affected the land tenure system. 
The fourth section examines changes in land tenure through macro-level statistical data and 
micro-level data collected by the authors in their field survey. In conclusion, certain policy 
implications are examined. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
and innumerable expulsions of Germans. 
3 In his careful examination of the causal relationship between land scarcity and genocide, Uvin rejects 
direct causality. See Uvin (1998, Chapter 9). 
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1. Methodology 
Our research is based on literature as well as on fieldwork. Since 1999, the authors 
have conducted joint fieldwork, mainly in two rural areas: a cell in Southern Province 
(hereafter Cell B), and a cell in Eastern Province (Cell R) (Figure 1). Cell refers to Rwanda’s 
smallest administrative unit, containing at least one salaried official. Several cells compose a 
sector, which is organized with other sectors to constitute a district. A province, composed of 
several districts, is the largest local unit. Rwanda instituted a series of local administrative 
reforms in the 2000s. In particular, in 2006 local administrative units were reorganized and 
integrated, thereby enlarging the territories of each 4 . A current cell now corresponds 
approximately to a former sector; while a former cell now corresponds to a unit called 
umudugudu (pl. imidugudu), though no salaried officials staff it5. 
 
 
Figure1. Local administration and research sites 
(Since 2006) 
                                                 
4 Before the 2006 reform, Cell B was a sector in Kibingo District in Butare Prefecture, while Cell R was 
a sector in Rukara District in Umutara Prefecture. 
5 Due to a series of local administrative reforms in the 2000s, names of local administrative units have 
been changed. The highest level of local administration, which today are four “Provinces” (Northern, 
Southern, Eastern and Western) and Kigali City, had been called “Prefectures.” “Districts,” the second 
 4
Our research strategy was to gain an understanding of local dynamics in a few selected 
areas through long-term observation. This method of “fixed point observation” is useful and 
appropriate for considering the relationship between politics and land, something which is 
deeply connected with people’s everyday lives and their personal history. Every year after 
1999, during Takeuchi’s trip (generally 2–4 weeks) to Rwanda, the authors visited two research 
sites. 
We selected the two research sites by taking different historical experiences into 
consideration. As we will discuss later, eastern Rwanda has seen a massive inflow of Tutsi 
returnees and frequent land division between these returnees and current inhabitants. By 
contrast, compared with the eastern areas, Tutsi returnees in the south of the country are fewer 
in number. The difference is due to intertwined political and geographical causes. The political 
factors will be discussed in later sections; we touch only on geographical differences here. 
Generally speaking, in Rwanda the further to the east one goes, the lower the elevation, 
the warmer the temperature, and the lower the precipitation. Our research site in Eastern 
Province, situated in the far eastern part of the country, adjoins Akagera National Park, 
bordering Tanzania. The elevation is about 1300-1500 meters, annual average temperature, 
about 20-21 degrees centigrade, and annual rainfall, less than 1,000 mm (Bart 1993, 41). 
Weather conditions in eastern Rwanda are generally more severe than in the western and 
central parts, contributing to the former being less densely populated than the latter. Our 
research site in Southern Province, near to the city of Butare, enjoys cooler temperatures and 
more abundant precipitation than in Eastern Province. Because of good climatic conditions and 
its role as a political center dating from the era of the traditional Kingdom of Rwanda6, 
southern Rwanda has very high population density. This is the main reason why Tutsi returnees 
                                                                                                                                               
largest unit, had been called “Communes.”  
6 At the end of the 19th century, the residence of the king was situated in Nyanza, a southern town near 
Butare City. Although the royal residence was often moved, the southern part of the country is 
considered the centre of the kingdom, in considering the fact that the ratio of Tutsi population has been 
especially high in the Butare area (Imbs, et al. 1994). 
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moved more noticeably into the east than into the south. 
Despite the geographical differences, however, subsistence agriculture without 
irrigation for such crops as sorghum, beans and potatoes is the main economic activity in both 
regions. 
To select the households for canvassing, we first carried out a medium-scale 
socio-economic survey of 208 rural households, of which half were located in Cell B and half 
in Cell R7. Among the 104 households in each cell, we selected 21 in Cell B and 22 in Cell R 
for deeper research. We tried to include a similar number of households from former-cells 
(current imudugudu) that constitute the current cell (former sector), but we did not apply 
random sampling methods to this selection. Instead, we tried to increase the reliability of 
interviews by building rapport with interviewees during the long period of research. 
Working in the field once or twice a year since 2000, we conducted interviews on a 
number of subjects, including agricultural management, income earning activities, wartime 
experiences, and recent judicial activities of Gacaca and Abunzi8. Along with the interviews, 
annually between 1999 and 2003 we measured every parcel of land owned and exploited by 
each household to record changes in their land holdings9. From the year 2000, we added all 
responsible persons in local administration, namely Sector-Chiefs (Conseiller) and Cell-Chiefs 
(Responsables), to our interviewees; so that the number came to be 26 in Cell R and 25 in Cell 
B. Other inhabitants of the cells and their nearby vicinities were interviewed as necessary. 
                                                 
7 For the results, see Takeuchi & Marara (2000). 
8 These are the names for local justice systems which have been recently introduced in Rwanda. 
Perpetrators during the genocide in 1994 are to be judged in Gacaca, while ordinary local conflicts are 
treated in Abunzi (see infra). 
9 There were mainly two reasons that we continued to measure their fields over five years. First, the 
measurement of land in the Rwandan context is not easy, as peasants generally have several parcels in 
different places and with different degrees of rights. As Bralel pointed out, the nature of the rights that a 
peasant can exert varies considerably from one parcel to another (Bralel 1994, 83-84); furthermore, it is 
sometimes difficult to judge which parcels they “own.” We considered it better to ask members of 
canvassed household about their lands during several consecutive years in order to clarify the nature of 
the rights that they can exert. We thought that this would result in more accurate data. The second reason 
was that we were interested in the different methods of land acquisition (inheritance, purchase, transfer 
from the state, borrowing), and their changes each year. 
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Research on Abunzi, to be discussed later in the paper, was started from 2008. The 
authors stayed about 10 days in Cell B in November 2008 and 10 days in total in Cell R in 
November 2008 and January 2009 to research this new justice system. In the two cells, we 
investigated written materials relating to the system and conducted interviews with concerned 
persons, such as local authorities, judges, and ordinary peasants. 
All the interviews were conducted by the two authors jointly, with discussion 
beforehand in French to decide the approximate contents. During the interviews, Marara spoke 
with the interviewees in Kinyarwanda and interpreted their answers for Takeuchi in French. No 
recording devices were used during the interviews. 
 
2. Politics and land: Historical background 
(1) Pre-colonial and colonial period 
With Rwanda’s favorable conditions for agriculture, its population density has been 
high since the early stages of state formation (Schoenbrun 1998). In the pre-colonial period, 
the Kingdom of Rwanda established a centralized administrative structure10. The land tenure 
system in the kingdom consisted of two major elements: isambu-igikingi and ubukonde. Put 
simply, the former was a landlord system, in which peasants11 had to provide their pastoral 
chiefs with tributes and sometimes with labor (called uburetwa). The latter was family land 
owned collectively by the family that had originally opened up the land.12 
The igikingi (pl. ibikingi. reserved pastoral estate granted by the king), which appeared 
during the 1840s as a consequence of population increase and pressure on the land, 
                                                 
10 The nyiginya kingdom had begun to develop in the seventeenth century as the biggest and strongest 
among the kingdoms and principalities in the area inhabited by Rwandan-speaking people. 
11 Peasants who provided tribute were generally Hutu. It is, however, important to emphasize that Tutsi 
also paid tribute. In principle, everybody except the king had to pay tribute. In addition, the ethnic 
boundary between Tutsi and Hutu was often so ambiguous in the pre-colonial period that the ethnic 
identity of tribute providers should not be limited to one category (Newbury 1988). As for labor services 
(uburetwa), providers were limited to Hutu peasants (Vansina 2001). 
12 For information regarding the traditional Rwandan land tenure system, see Reisdorff (1952), Maquet 
& Naigiziki (1957), Adriaenssens (1962), Vidal (1969, 1974), André & Lavigne Delville (1998), Vansina 
(2001). 
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exacerbated exploitation by a small number of powerful pastoralists to the detriment of 
peasants and other pastoralists (Vansina 2001, 168) 13. Generally speaking, pastoralists here 
would be Tutsi, and peasants, Hutu14. The powerful pastoralists, who were connected with the 
king and provided with ibikingi, could possess sufficient grazing area, but the land rights of 
peasants and small pastoralists were unstable due to land scarcity. 
In the colonial period, the land rights of peasants became further endangered. Although 
problems related to land during the colonial period are too complicated to describe in detail 
here, conflict over land intensified due to several factors including population growth, various 
modernization policies, and political change following colonization. Under these 
circumstances, peasants often faced the real risk of expulsion from their land due to arbitrary 
decisions by chiefs or conflicts with them. 
Politically powerful Tutsis continued to enjoy the privileged use of lands, like ibikingi. 
Nevertheless, one important change should be noted: due to the administrative reform of the 
1920s, which reorganized local administration through newly created chiefdoms and 
sub-chiefdoms, the political power of chiefs and sub-chiefs expanded considerably (Reyntjens 
1985, 111-129). People in these positions used their political power to create their own ibikingi 
(Nkurikiyimfura 1994, 227), though in the pre-colonial period only the king had this right. The 
creation of the new ibikingi, along with the population increase of the same period, brought an 
exacerbation of land scarcity15. 
                                                 
13 Notice that Vansina (2001) avoids the term “igikingi.”(168, n.22).  
14 As for ethnicity in Rwanda (Tutsi, Hutu, Ttwa), there is not enough space to explain the history of 
ethnic formation (See for example, Vansina 2001; Newbury 1988; Vidal 1969; Takeuchi 2000). 
Important in this discussion are the following three points: First, the Rwandan population is mainly 
composed of Tutsi and Hutu (the third group Twa is an extremely small, with less than one percent of 
the total population), in which the former is a minority (around 10 to 15 percent) and the latter is a 
majority (85 to 90 percent); Second, the Tutsi and the Hutu have a long history of coexistence, which is 
clearly shown by the fact that neither language nor religion can characterize their difference and they 
have always cohabitated the same land; Third, the distinction of and antagonism between the two groups 
strengthened during the colonial period. While ethnic identity and even the antagonism between them 
already existed at the latter half of the nineteenth century (Vansina 2001, 177), they tended to be 
exacerbated in the first half of the twentieth century, thus culminating in the “social revolution” at the 
end of the colonial period. 
15 Due to the fact that the reform granted strong political power to the newly selected chiefs and 
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Through the pre-colonial and colonial periods, those who had strong political power 
enjoyed privileged land use to the detriment of ordinary people, both Tutsi and Hutu. With only 
tenuous land rights, they continually confronted the risk of appropriation. 
 
(2) The “social revolution” and its impact on land tenure 
Political turbulence, ignited by a collision between the supporters of the Tutsi-led 
UNAR party (Union Nationale Rwandaise) and those of the Hutu-led PARMEHUTU party 
(Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation Hutu) in November 1959, quickly expanded 
throughout the country. This first-ever large scale ethnic conflict is called the “social 
revolution.”16 The PARMEHUTU, assisted by colonial authorities, were the victors, resulting 
in the overthrow of the existing political system dominated by Tutsi elites. Consequently, by 
the mid 1960s as many as 200,000 to 300,000 UNAR supporters and their families,17 most of 
them Tutsi, had either fled the country or been expelled.18 
The impact of the social revolution on the land was enormous, though it is impossible 
to measure its exact magnitude. After the mass outflow of “old-case refugees,” as they came to 
be called (refer to Section 3 below), vast lands without owners were left behind and then 
confiscated by local authorities, who were at the same time leaders of the PARMEHUTU party. 
These local authorities, especially the Bourgmestres (chiefs of commune),19 wielded enough 
official power to redistribute the confiscated lands after the social revolution (André and 
Lavigne-Delville 1998, 161). A lot of land originally occupied by Tutsi families or reserved as 
ibikingi, were arbitrarily distributed. 
                                                                                                                                               
sub-chiefs, competition for land between new chiefs and ex-chiefs tended to increase, as the former 
often created ibikingi by appropriating land of the latter. For information regarding land conflicts in the 
colonial period, see Reisdorff (1952) and Adriaenssens (1962). 
16 For a detailed analysis of the social revolution, see Lemarchand (1970) and Reyntjens (1985). 
17 Refugees statistics are referenced from Lemarchand (1970, 172), Lugan (1997, 436), Reyntjens (1985, 
455) and Prunier (1995, 62).  
18 Refugee outflow of Tutsis took place once again in 1973, when the politically weakened Kayibanda 
regime carried out a campaign against them. 
19 A “commune” was a unit of local administrations established at the time of independence after the 
“sub-chiefdom,” the lowest unit of administration in the colonial period, was abolished. In 2001, due to 
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In Cell B, we observed several households that had acquired lands from the commune 
authority after independence. Two examples are as follows: 
1. LR, a Hutu male, was born in 1934 in the southern part of Rwanda, near the Burundi 
border. He moved to Cell B in 1961 and has lived there ever since. When he first moved into 
the area, the Bourgmestre authorized his occupancy of a particular plot of land. He even 
purchased a land certificate for 50 Rwanda Francs (Frw). However, the parcel that the local 
authorities had given to him previously belonged to a Tutsi family who had fled in 1959. When 
the Tutsi family returned to Cell B in 2000, they asked LR to return the land to them. Having 
resided in Cell B for so long, LR no longer had claim to any land in his place of birth. He 
finally agreed to divide the land, giving half to the Tutsi family. In 2003 his total property 
consisted of a field of 0.11 ha and a small parcel of woodland (0.24 ha), which he cultivated to 
feed his family.20 
2. NP, a Hutu male born in 1934, came to Cell B in 1943 with his mother. He acquired a 
parcel of land in 1961 when NZ assumed the office of Bourgmestre and BI was sector chief 
(Conseiller). In assisting the Bourgestre, BI was able to exert influence on the distribution of 
land, allowing his friend NP to acquire some. The lands NP received had originally belonged to 
RM and GT, both of whom were Tutsi sub-chiefs who had fled the country due to the social 
revolution. In 1961, NP paid 400 Frw for a land certificate.21 
These two examples show how local authorities redistributed land to those in need. In 
addition, the second case indicates that this process often was not transparent, as friends of 
authorities received special privileges in the land redistribution process. The redistribution of 
land previously owned by Tutsi families was frequently carried out in areas where land scarcity 
                                                                                                                                               
administrative reform, they were reorganized into “districts”. 
20 Annual interview since 1999. 
21 Interview on 17 October 2005. 
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already was a problem22, and the beneficiaries were often landless migrants. The result was an 
official redistribution of land through the local administration, complete with issuance of 
certificates. We will see in the following sections that land ownership acquired in this way 
would be jeopardized after the civil war of the 1990s. 
 
3. The Rwandan civil war and its impact on land tenure 
In order to understand the impact of the Rwandan civil war on land tenure, the actors, 
causes, and developments of the war must be known. The main protagonists in the 1990’s 
conflict were on the one hand the Rwandan government, led by President J. Habyarimana, and 
on the other hand the predominantly Tutsi-led rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
War broke out in October 1990 when the RPF invaded the northern part of the country.  
The RPF was created in Uganda by Rwandan refugees whose parents had fled the 
homeland due to waves of conflict and persecution since 1959. The children of these refugees 
were the core members of the RPF (Prunier 1998; Otunnu 2000). 
Habyarimana seized political power in 1973 when he led a coup d’état that toppled G. 
Kayibanda, the leader of PARMEHUTU and the first president of Rwanda. Habyarimana, like 
Kayibanda, did not allow Tutsi refugees to repatriate. In addition, both made use of a one-party 
system to mobilize political and economic resources in highly personalized ways.23 While the 
Tutsis were systematically marginalized during the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, 
being Hutu did not necessarily assure access to power. Power, both political and economic, 
was monopolized by a small number of families closely linked to the presidential entourage.24 
One consequence of this situation was that the RPF was composed not only of the children of 
                                                 
22 According to Blarel (1994, 77-78), land acquisition through “government allocation” was particularly 
important in Gitarama and Butare Prefectures. From this fact, we estimate that the redistribution of land 
after the social revolution would have been frequent in these areas. 
23 For information regarding the political system of the Kayibanda regime, see Reyntjens (1985). As for 
the politics of the Habyarimana era, see Gasana (2002) and Munyarugerero (2003). 
24 These core members of Habyarimana regime were called “akazu,” which meant “the little house“. On 
this point, see for example Guichaoua dir. (1995, 768), Reyntjens (1995), Prunier (1995), Melvern 
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Tutsi refugees, but also Hutu elites who were denied power under the Habyarimana regime. 
After the outbreak of war in 1990, the international community made efforts to secure 
a ceasefire and peace agreement. These attempts came to fruition in August 1993 with the 
conclusion of the Arusha Peace Agreement, stipulating power sharing between the 
Habyarimana government, opposition parties, and the RPF. Ethnic tensions heightened 
considerably, however, after the conclusion of the Arusha agreement due to several factors 
including ethnic instigation by the core group of the Habyarimana regime and the assassination 
of Burundi’s Hutu president in October 1993. The subsequent assassination of President 
Habyarimana on April 6, 1994 led to the genocide against the Tutsi, and against the Hutu 
supporters of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The ceasefire collapsed and the reignited civil war 
continued for three months until the RPF gained a military victory, stopped the genocide and 
established a new political authority in July 1994.25  
By that time, the Rwandan civil war and genocide had resulted in multiple waves of 
refugees and internally displaced persons. Approximately five waves can be distinguished:  
First, the RPF invasion itself entailed an inflow of refugees from Uganda into the 
northern part of Rwanda. At the time of invasion, in October 1990, the RPF was 2,000 strong, 
and by late 1992 it had increased to 12,000 (Prunier 1998, 130-132). Most of these were people 
from refugee families who had been born and raised in neighboring countries, such as Uganda. 
Second, while their exact scale is difficult to estimate, a number of Tutsi left Rwanda 
to escape persecution26 for their suspected support of the RPF or to participate in the rebel 
movement during the civil war. 
Third, the RPF victory precipitated a tremendous outflow of Hutu refugees, more than 
1.5 million ordinary people and the leaders of the defeated Habyarimana regime (Prunier 1995; 
                                                                                                                                               
(2004). 
25 For developments of the Rwandan civil war, see Prunier (1995), Jones (2001), and Melvern (2004). 
26 For violations of human rights against the Tutsi after the outbreak of the civil war, see Association 
rwandaise pour la défense des droits de la personne et des libertés publiques (1992). 
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Adelman 2003).27 These refugees installed themselves in massive refugee camps in eastern 
Zaire (i.e., the Democratic Republic of the Congo, hereafter DRC), Burundi, Tanzania and 
southern Uganda. 
Fourth, in the same time period huge numbers of Tutsi refugees returned to Rwanda. 
These were people who had fled the country because of a series of persecutions after the 
“social revolution” and were now able to return due to the RPF victory. In 1994, these 
so-called “old-case” refugees (returnees) flowed back in numbers of up to 900,000 (Office of 
United Nations Resident Coordinator for Rwanda 2000, 2). 
Fifth, the most recent was the return of Hutu refugees who had fled in 1994. This 
movement was triggered by a 1996 outbreak of armed conflict in DRC.28 In the few months 
following November 1996, some 1.5 million people had moved back into Rwanda. These 
returnees who in 1994 and following years had taken refuge in neighboring countries came to 
be called “new-case” refugees (returnees). The old-case refugees were mainly Tutsi and the 
new-case refugees were mainly Hutu, although there were exceptions. 
These massive migrations had an enormous impact on land tenure, although the impact 
differed from one region to another. The huge inflow of old-case Tutsi refugees was 
concentrated in the eastern part of the country. Indeed, many old-case refugees had lived in 
Uganda and Tanzania, and for them eastern Rwanda was the nearest and easiest destination. 
Furthermore, new local authorities in Rwanda guided old-case returnees, not to their 
birthplaces, but to the east where population density was relatively low and most of the 
original inhabitants were absent because they had left as new-case refugees This decision 
seemed to have been taken on the grounds that Rwanda’s population density was generally 
                                                 
27 Ordinary Hutu refugees had been brought by the leaders of the defeated Habyarimana regime, who 
threatened them by saying that the RPF would retaliate indiscriminately against the Hutu after taking 
power. 
28 Rwandan refugees, who had fled the country due to the RPF victory, continued to stay in camps along 
the boarder of Eastern DRC. Being controlled by the political and military leaders of the Habyarimana 
government, the camps became the de facto military base of the former regime and repeated military 
attacks followed on Rwandan territory. This situation triggered Rwandan military intervention and the 
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very high,29 and that most of the property that had belonged to old-case refugees was already 
redistributed to Hutu peasants (we will deal with this point later). 
When new-case refugees (mostly Hutu) returned to their country in large waves, they 
were therefore confronted with the inhabitants (old-case refugees and the original population) 
now occupying their former properties (houses and land). The Rwandan authorities addressed 
the situation by ordering that houses occupied by old-case returnees should be returned to their 
new-case returnee former owners, with the caveat that the land was to be divided equally 
between the two parties. It was in this way that old-case returnees were able officially to 
acquire land. In most cases, this policy was carried out without significant turmoil. While it is 
inconceivable that Hutu new-case returnees willingly accepted the land division, the RPF-led 
government was strong enough to impose the measure.  
 
 
Figure2. Local administration and research sites 
(Until 2005) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
outbreak of the civil war in the DRC. 
29 According to a 2002 census, the average population density of the country was as high as 322 
inhabitants per square kilometer (République rwandaise, Service national de recensement 2003). 
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4. Structure of land tenure and land conflict 
(1) Land division 
In this section we examine the influence of the Rwandan civil war and the flow of 
refugees on land tenure through use of our fieldwork data. We examine micro data taken in two 
different cells situated in Southern and Eastern Provinces (ex-Prefectures Butare and Kibungo, 
see Figure 2), where since 1999, the authors have repeatedly conducted field surveys. 
The general characteristics of land tenure in the two ex-prefectures concerned are 
indicated in Table 1. The figures are based on national census data from 1990.30 From this 
table, it is clear that land holdings in Rwanda were generally very small (around 0.6 ha of 
cultivated land on national average) even before the civil war, and that properties in the 
southern part of the country (Butare) are much smaller than those in the eastern part 
(Kibungo).  
 
Table 1.  Land use per household (October 1989 - March 1990)
(Square meters)
National
Butare Kibungo average
Cultivated area 5,101 9,999 6,211
Fallow & pasturage 2,240 3,933 2,370
Woodlands 763 407 1,166
Non-cultivable & housing 273 557 319
Total area 8,377 14,897 10,066
Source: Republique Rwandaise, Ministere de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage (1992, 46).
Prefecture
 
 
The difference between the two regions in average land area is attributable directly to 
population density. As discussed above, due to a favorable climate for agriculture, population 
density in the Butare area has always been high31 and the statistical data indicate that 
                                                 
30 We could not find reliable national or province level statistics concerning land holdings after the civil 
war and genocide. 
31 Though we don’t have sufficient data, lands in the southern part of the country tend to be more fertile 
than those in the eastern part because of favorable climate as well as human effort. In the area around 
Cell B, we have often observed peasants putting manure in their fields, while such behavior is less 
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population pressure has increased land fragmentation. In eastern Rwanda higher temperatures 
and more sporadic rainfall have negatively affected population density. The 2002 national 
census data confirm the differences in population density: the population density per square 
kilometer in Butare Prefecture (where Cell B is located) was 386, while that of Umutara 
Prefecture (where Cell R is located) was 100 (République Rwandaise, Service National de 
Recensement 2003, 17). We should also note that a part of the second research site (Cell R) 
was originally situated inside Akagera National Park, which in effect was protected from 
human settlements although these had been implicitly allowed since the 1970s. Although in the 
1990s the area was no longer considered to be inside the National Park, the population density 
has remained relatively low. 
 
Table 2. Land holdings of canvassed households in Cell B and Cell R
 (Average from 1999 to 2003)
Cell B Cell R
Average exploited land （㎡） 4,719 10,200
  Median 3,144 9,533
  Maximum 18,392 34,158
  Minimum 104 1,424
  Standard deviation 4,401.3 5,229.9
  Gini coefficient 0.47 0.33
Average owned land （㎡） 5,793 8,616
  Median 3,049 8,229
  Maximum 23,769 22,714
  Minimum 399 764
  Average standard deviation 7,818.3 5,189.8
  Average Gini coefficient 0.58 0.37
Source: Survey data.
Note: N=21 (Cell B), N=22 (Cell R).  
 
Table 2 shows the characteristics of land distribution in the research areas after the 
civil war. The data were collected from the same households in the two cells (then called 
                                                                                                                                               
observable around Cell R. Difference in land size, therefore, do not directly correspond with differences 
in agricultural production. 
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“sectors”) between 1999 and 2003. All data are shown in a five year average. Though the 
number of samples is too small to be representative of each cell,32 the table presents the 
general characteristics of the land holdings in the two areas. From it two regional differences 
emerge.33 One characteristic is that average land holdings in Cell R are much larger than those 
in Cell B.34 This is in line with pre-war differences at the province level, shown in Table 1. 
Another characteristic has to do with the inequality of land holdings within the same 
region: Gini35 coefficients in Cell R are much smaller than those in Cell B for both exploited 
and owned land. “Exploited land” refers to land currently held and used by a household. It 
includes borrowed parcels but excludes parcels rented out. “Owned land” is land for which a 
household has right of disposal. The fact that land division was extensive in Cell R may partly 
explain its lower Gini coefficient. We have observed that a number of households lost or 
acquired parcels due to land division in this cell. Among 22 canvassed households in Cell R, 
whose data are shown in Table 2, eight were old-case returnees; among 13 canvassed Hutu 
household heads, six had divided their properties to concede to old-case returnees. 
 
Table 3. Ways of land acquisition in two Cells  (Average from 1999 to 2003)
Cell B Cell R
Inheritance 74% 40%
Purchase 16% 23%
Transfer from the state 10% 36%
Total owned land 100% 100%
Source: Survey data.
Note: N=21(Cell B), N=22 (Cell R).  
                                                 
32 Population of the Sector corresponding to Cell B was 3,980, while that corresponding to Cell R was 
5,050 in 2000 (Takeuchi and Marara 2000, 34). In 2006, the population of Cell B was 4,479 (interview 
with the head of the cell), while that of Cell R was unknown. Although we measured the fields of chiefs 
of cells and sectors (“responsable” and “conseiller”), we did not include them in the data constituting 
Table 2 because their land holdings were generally larger than those of ordinary peasants, thus affecting 
the analytic results. 
33 Another point to be gleaned from Table 2 is the difference between owned and exploited land, which 
indicates the existence of land renting. We do not argue this point here. See Takeuchi and Marara 
(2007). 
34 The tendency of difference changes little even if we take the median. 
35 Gini is a measure of inequality. It is generally expressed as a figure between 0 and 1. 0 indicates total 
equality, and 1 extreme inequality. 
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Frequent land division in Cell R is also indicated by another set of data. During the 
measurement of fields, the authors asked systematically how the households had acquired each 
parcel of their owned lands. Table 3, which aggregated the results of measurement and 
interviews, shows the different composition of owned lands in the two cells. Land acquisition 
by transfer from the state was much more important in Cell R than in Cell B, where inheritance 
was overwhelmingly the important mean for acquiring land. The distinction can be explained 
by the fact that land division had been frequent in Cell R, such that people considered parcels 
acquired by land division to be transfers from the state. 
The Cell R experience with land division can be traced from the interviews. Three 
examples are as follows: 
1. BJ, a Hutu born in 1965, lives with his wife (born in 1978), two children (daughters 
born in 1999 and in 2000) and a son of his sister. He was a member of the Gendarme (military 
police) before the civil war. In July 1994, informed that the RPF had taken control of the 
capital, he crossed the border without fighting and escaped into DRC. He returned to Cell R in 
December 1996. Arriving home, he found that the fields he had inherited from his grandfather 
had been occupied by an old-case returnee (RT, born in 1941). BJ was therefore obliged to 
divide his fields with RT. Among the five parcels that BJ had inherited, he gave half of each of 
four parcels to RT, retaining the smallest one for himself. As of August 2002, the total area of 
BJ’s exploited lands (identical to his owned lands) amounted to 0.97 ha. Except for a parcel 
that he purchased in 2002 as a site for a new house (0.06 ha), the size of his property was 
almost equal that of RT’s (0.88 ha). After the division of lands, RT had given BJ a calf in 
thanks. In 2001, RT, who had been a widower, married one of BJ’s young cousins, born in 
1981.36 
2. MJ (born in 1971) and NT (born in 1974) are Hutu brothers. When war recurred in 
April 1994, their mother was killed by a RPF soldier and the family fled in fear to Tanzania. 
                                                 
36 Annual interview since 1999.  
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When they returned home in December 1996, they found their family land occupied by an 
old-case returnee (ME, a Tutsi born in 1964 in Uganda). The father of the brothers was 
therefore obliged to divide his land. As he had a second wife, he divided the land into three 
equal portions, giving one to ME, and another to the second wife and her seven children. He 
then divided the third piece into four roughly equal parcels for his three children (including MJ 
and NT) and himself. The father and his late first wife had a fourth son who still lived in 
Tanzania as of January 2009. If this son returns to Cell R, the land will have to be divided once 
again.  
ME, for his part, had returned to Uganda in 1994 with his father who was born in 
Butare in 1925. Persuaded by the local authorities not to return to Butare, ME and his father 
decided to settle in Cell R. ME’s father acquired land by division from another original 
inhabitant. Using a recently purchased sewing machine, ME was able to earn income from 
tailoring. He decided in 2002, therefore, to sell part of his field (0.09ha) to the father of MJ and 
NT, the two brothers, for 7,000 Frw (Rwandan Francs: 1 US dollar was about 450 Frw as of 
August 2001). ME did this, he said, for their sake as he wanted to mitigate their discontent. As 
of August 2003, after the sale, ME still owned 0.53 ha of land, in contrast to MJ whose parcel 
was a mere 0.29 ha and NT whose was only 0.26 ha. With such small parcels, the brothers still 
have to borrow others’ fields to support themselves and their families.37 
3. MA, a Tutsi, was born in Uganda in 1969. He acquired a parcel of 0.53ha from the 
Commune in 1994 when he returned. After his return, he started a retail business using his 
network with Ugandan merchants. He borrowed money and ran a small retail shop next to a 
market. With success in the retail business, he turned to wholesale merchandising, dealing with 
various beverages. In addition to the parcel acquired by land division, he had a parcel of 0.81ha 
which he was able to purchase for 72,000 Frw before 1999. When we met MA in January 2009, 
he was very busy conducting his business and reluctant to accept a long interview. When we 
                                                 
37 Annual interview since 1999. 
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interviewed him in 2001, he told us that he had become aware that his neighbor was discontent 
with the land division and that he intended to return the land back to the neighbor. Although 
the success of his business has made him rich, as of 2009 he has not yet returned the land.38 
 
The land division policy for providing old-case returnees with land is unquestionably a 
radical method, especially in a country with a high population density like Rwanda. It can, in 
fact, be dangerous in the sense that such forcible measures might foster grievances, not only 
directed against old-case returnees but also against the government.39 Surprisingly however, in 
light of the importance of land to Rwandan famers, there has to date been no observed 
appearance of strong resistance to the land divisions.40 
Two factors related to the outcome of the civil war might explain why the original 
inhabitants have accepted land division without strong resistance: First and foremost is the fact 
that the RPF prevailed in the civil war. The policy of dividing land, which favored old-case 
returnees to the detriment of original inhabitants, was understood by the population to be 
related to the RPF military victory. 
A second important factor related to the RPF military victory is the subsequent 
composition of administration at decentralized levels. Throughout the one-party system of the 
Habyarimana and Kayibanda eras,41 only dedicated party members could be nominated for 
                                                 
38 Annual interview since 1999. 
39 The forcible characteristic of this policy may be related to the agenda of Rwandan elites, who have 
been trying to transform rural society through “a top-down developmentalist agenda.” (Ansoms 2009, 
292). 
40 Rwandan rural society is not really so simple. Though no serious reaction against the land divisions 
has been observed, there must be hidden resistance. Complexities in post-genocide Rwandan rural 
society were well documented in Ingelaere (2007). 
41 Although Rwanda had a multi-party system at the time of independence, in the mid 1960s the 
PRAMEHUTU became the de facto sole legal party, monopolizing all seats of the national as well as 
local parliaments. Habyarimana, after having taken power in a 1973 coup d’état, established his own 
party (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, or MRND) and stipulated a de 
jure one-party system in the 1978 constitution. He re-introduced a multi-party system in 1991, but the 
composition of local authorities did not change rapidly, except in regions where opposition parties 
(especially Mouvement Démocratique Républicain, which was mainly a Hutu party) had strong 
influence. In any case, the Tutsi had been politically marginalized in post-colonial Rwanda until the 
RPF victory. 
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positions in local authorities. In effect, these were almost all Hutu. But the make-up of local 
authorities changed radically after the RPF won. After the 1994 RPF victory, Tutsi returnees 
and survivors42 began to see themselves wielding strong power within local administrations. 
Table 4 shows the characteristics of local authorities in the period 1999-2002 in two canvassed 
former sectors, corresponding approximately to the actual cells. The table shows that the 
leaders in local administrations were supplanted by Tutsi old-case returnees and survivors. This 
shift was significant in smoothing implementation of the land division policies because these 
eager RPF supporters strove both to support and guide land division and to control and 
suppress discontent43. 
 
Table 4. Local authorities in two research sites (1999～March 2002）
Year of birth Sex Ethnicity Note
Current "Cell R"
Sector-chief 1955 M Tutsi Old-case returnees
Cell-chief 1 1949 M Tutsi Old-case returnees
Cell-chief 2 1960 M Tutsi Survivor
Cell-chief 3 1947 M Tutsi Old-case returnees
Cell-chief 4 1963 M Tutsi Old-case returnees
Current "Cell B"
Sector-chief 1970 M Tutsi Survivor
Cell-chief 1 1943 M Hutu
Cell-chief 2 1957 M Tutsi Survivor
Cell-chief 3 1963 M Hutu
Cell-chief 4 1971 M Hutu
Source: Survey data.
Note: In this table, Sector and Cell chiefs concern administrative units 
        before the reform in 2006.  
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Tutsis who managed to survive the slaughter of 1994 are called, “survivors.” 
43 Recently, the Rwandan government has introduced a system of “performance contract” (imihigo), 
concluded between the president and local administrators. The introduction of the “performance 
contract” has strengthened governmental control over local administrations (Ingelaere 2007). Notice that 
the policy of land division was implemented around 1996-97, i.e. before the introduction of the 
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(2) Land conflict and mediation by Abunzi 
Today, the division of land is a fait accompli. It is rare to see land division contested 
or challenged openly by original inhabitants. This is confirmed by data on Abunzi, a 
village-level justice system that has been in effect since 2007.44 Abunzi, literally meaning 
“reconciliation committee,” have been established in each cell and are composed of nine 
elected cell members. Minor offenses and conflicts within a cell are to be mediated by Abunzi. 
If the mediation is not accepted by the litigants, the case is sent to a local tribunal. 
Figure 3  Causes of conflicts dealt by Abunzi
(Cell B, January 2007 - November 2008)
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Figure 3. Causes of conflicts dealt by Abunzi 
(Cell B, January 2007 - Nove r 2 08) 
Source: Survey data. 
Note: 
1. “Field boundaries” refers to troubles regarding field borders. They range from suits against an act of pulling out 
trees to mark boundaries to conflicts regarding to whom fields belong. “Inheritance” problems relate to conflicts 
among family members. Many of these are concerned with the allocation of property such as lands and houses. 
“Financial troubles” include civil disputes concerning money: typical cases are the refusal to render a debt or to 
pay money for purchased goods. “Other defaults” refer to various types of non-fulfillment of contracts, which 
includes a suit against a man who sold a pig that he had been asked to keep, and a suit against a man who 
refused to render fields that he had borrowed. Cases of “trouble with old-case returnees” are explained in the 
paper. “Refusal of official order” means a refusal to implement a decision of a tribunal. 
2. The number of cases examined was 127. The cases were classified according to cause of conflict by the author. 
Some cases are classified into two categories: for example “field boundaries” and “inheritance,” or “theft” and 
“insult.” The total number of cases classified was 167. 
                                                                                                                                               
“performance contract.” 
44 This system is based on Organic Law no.31/2006 of 14/08/2006 on Organisation, Jurisdiction, 
Competence, and Functioning of the Mediation Committee. 
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 Figures 3 and 4 show causes of conflict dealt with by Abunzi in the two canvassed cells. 
The difference in the number of cases in the two cells is partially due to the difference in the 
time period covered. It is longer in Cell B. While in Cell B the same committee of Abunzi 
continued work starting from the introduction of the system (January 2007), the first 
committee in Cell R resigned due to accusations of corruption. As written materials were lost 
in the process and unavailable to us, the number of the cases in Cell R is far smaller than that 
in Cell B. 
 
Figure 4  Causes of conflcts dealt by Abunzi
(Cell R, September 2008 - January 2009)
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Fig nzi ure 4. Causes of conflcts dealt by Abu
(Cell R, September 2008 - January 2009) 
Source: Survey data. 
Note: The number of cases examined was 39. The number is much smaller than that for Cell B, because 
the period covered by the data was much shorter. Some cases were classified in two categories, thus 
making the total number of cases 57. 
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From the two figures, we can discern the main causes of conflict at the local level. 
Problems concerning land are the most numerous causes of conflict. This is understandable, as 
cultivable land is the most important kind of property for ordinary peasants in Rwanda. One 
might roughly differentiate three types of land conflicts: conflicts related to “field boundaries,” 
conflicts related to “inheritance” problems, and conflicts related to “troubles with old-case 
returnees.” 
However, local conflicts often emerge within families. In fact, cases classified as “field 
boundaries” often overlap with “inheritance.” These two causes are often inseparable because 
problems arise when land inheritance is contested within the family. Familial relationships 
were so complicated that conflicts have to be brought to Abunzi. The following is an example: 
 
PT, who was the daughter of a divorced woman, claimed her right to family land. She and 
her mother left Cell R after the divorce; meanwhile, PT’s father died and his land was sold 
to a third party, NT. PT sued NT, claiming rights to the land that he had bought. Abunzi 
judged that the land was to be divided between the two parties. Both parties accepted. 
 
The figures also show that the number of cases concerning land division with old-case 
returnees was relatively small: five in each cell. In examining each of these cases, we found 
that all judgments by Abunzi adhered to official guidelines about land division with old-case 
returnees. The guidelines, which had been informed through local authority, were as follows: 
1) if the actual owner does not live on the site claimed by an old-case returnee, and if he/she 
possesses land elsewhere, the entirety of the claimed land should be given to the returnee; 2) if 
the actual owner lives on the site of the claimed land, and if he/she possesses land elsewhere, 
the claimed land should be given to the returnee, except the house and its surroundings; 3) if 
the actual owner lives on the site of the claimed land, and if he/she has no land elsewhere, the 
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land should be equally divided between the two parties.45 All Abunzi judgments regarding 
“troubles with old-case returnees” followed the guidelines without exception. Their application 
is therefore considered to be strict. 
 
(3) Contrasting reactions to land division 
Despite the apparent compliance with official guidelines, many of those we 
interviewed in Cell B, including some local authorities and Abunzi members, expressed 
concern about land disputes with old-case returnees. Although the old-case returnees have 
tended to stay in the eastern part of Rwanda, regardless of their origins, some of them did 
return to the homelands where their families had lived before the social revolution. In Cell B 
several old-case refugees came back after 1994 and began to press for land division. Their 
lands, however, had been occupied by other inhabitants who had immigrated to the cell in the 
1960s and who had acquired the plots with the permission of the local authorities at that time. 
It was clear that land division with old-case returnees would make it very difficult for them to 
survive, as the plots were too small to divide. Still, as we have seen in Section 1, even if the 
current inhabitant has only a tiny plot and even if he holds an official certificate, he must 
render land back to an old-case refugee once the latter’s claim is judged to be legitimate by the 
authorities. 
In contrast with Cell B, anxieties were not expressed so explicitly in Cell R. This may 
be paradoxical, as the number of inhabitants affected by land division, as well as the scale of 
land divided, is clearly greater in Cell R than in Cell B. Local authorities in Cell R declared to 
us that the division of land has been settled, and that the people have accepted the outcome. 
Although this may be little more than an official statement, even ordinary inhabitants tended 
not to express complaints. One reason for this is the relative abundance of land in Cell R. As 
                                                 
45 Interview conducted with a sector chief in Cell B on 16 August 2002. These guidelines are well 
known throughout the country.  
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was previously explained, more land is available in eastern Rwanda and this might alleviate the 
impact of land division. However, a more important reason is probably the nature of power 
relations in Rwanda’s local politics. The number of old-case returnees and their political 
influence are considerable in Cell R, making it more difficult to openly complain or voice 
anxiety about land division. Most land division was carried out between 1996 and 1997 when 
new-case refugees massively returned. Many years have since passed and people seem 
gradually to have given up on openly complaining about the issue. In Cell B, however, where 
the number and the influence of old-case returnees are much smaller, people feel freer to 
express their concern and anxiety about land division. 
  
Concluding remarks and policy implications 
The RPF victory in the Rwandan civil war and the subsequent mass return of old-case 
refugees brought drastic changes in land tenure within a short period of time, especially in the 
eastern part of the country. Land division could be interpreted as a move to provide resources 
for supporters of the newly established government, but it could also be seen as the 
manifestation of an unavoidable obligation to care for those who had long been prevented from 
returning to their homeland. In either case, land division was a significant development in an 
established tradition of political factors decisively affecting land holdings. 
For in modern Rwandan history, land holdings have always been affected by political 
factors. In fact, Rwanda has a long history of politicization of land: those who held political 
power often intervened and appropriated land for their own purposes. Both land redistribution 
by the administration after the “social revolution” and division of land after the RPF victory 
are clearly in line with this tradition. In fact, it is against the backdrop of this tradition that 
people were mobilized during the genocide of 1994. When the authors interviewed genocide 
suspects and asked about their motivation for participating,46 they frequently explained that 
                                                 
46 The author conducted interviews with nearly 50 suspects in the genocide at three prisons (Butare, 
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land had been implicitly promised them by politicians: they were led to believe that if they 
killed and expelled the Tutsis, they would be given their land47. The Rwandan civil war and 
genocide in the 1990s were thus closely linked to the “social revolution” through old-case 
refugees and lands. 
This paper has shown, first, that the structure of Rwandan land tenure experienced a 
drastic change after the civil war of the 1990s, and second, that such politically motivated 
changes in land tenure have followed a long historical trajectory dating back to the pre-colonial 
period. In Rwanda, individual land rights have always been at the mercy of political powers. 
Land ownership, consequently, has been strongly influenced by macro-politics. The land tenure 
system is now assured by the legitimacy of the RPF, the winner of the civil war and the 
controller of the government. Governmental guidelines for land division for old-case returnees 
have been well followed, not necessarily because people were satisfied with them, but because 
disobedience is regarded as politically dangerous. Actual land holdings, therefore, could be 
contested, challenged, or even revised if the authority of the RPF is ever questioned. In other 
words, Rwandan land rights remain closely linked to macro-level politics. 
A vicious circle between unstable land rights and unstable politics is clearly 
undesirable. To prevent this possibility, it is important now to gradually stabilize actual land 
rights by balancing the discontent of old-case and new-case refugee returnees. Toward this end, 
political measures are necessary at both the micro and macro levels. 
At the micro level, it is crucial for the government to strengthen its legitimacy and gain 
the trust of the local population. For this purpose, land-related policies should include a 
pro-poor perspective, with special attention to vulnerable people in rural areas. In the Rwandan 
context, significant numbers of nearly landless peasants warrant attention because they are 
most affected by land division, as we have seen in the case of Cell B. Policies adopted for the 
                                                                                                                                               
Nsinda, Byumba) in Rwanda in 2003. 
47 See also Straus (2006). 
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purpose of caring for these people and providing them with a social safety net may be helpful 
in changing their perception of their government. One such policy was observed recently in 
Eastern Province, where huge ranches possessed by military officers were divided and 
distributed among peasants who had previously had access only to small plots of land.48 Such 
actions help to improve the general perception of the government and enhance its legitimacy in 
rural societies.49 
At the macro level, the government should make the efforts required to open up the 
political sphere: an inclusive democracy will help to stabilize land rights in the long run. 
Political exclusion and conflict have been directly and repeatedly linked throughout the history 
of Rwanda. The two recent internal conflicts which brought drastic changes in land tenure are 
rooted in ethnicity-related political exclusion. Since the civil war victory in 1994, the Rwandan 
government has tried to gradually open up the political sphere, even while it has often been 
criticized as authoritarian. Such efforts should be enhanced. As Rwandan history clearly shows, 
a political regime that excludes part of its citizens cannot be stable. Integrating opposing 
parties into the political order is the most effective means for achieving long-term stability. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 These ranches, which were originally a part of the National Park, had been repossessed by RPF 
officers after the civil war, and had often been a source of trouble with the local inhabitants; damage to 
crops caused by cattle was an especially serious problem. Local inhabitants generally appreciated the 
dismantling and redistribution of these ranch lands. (Interview in Cell R in January 2009. See also, New 
Times, 31st January 2008, “Kagame winds up land re-distribution launch,” as well as Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: May 1st 2008, “The political scene: The president oversees land 
redistribution under new law.”) 
49 Our research is not sufficient to examine the policy agenda in rural areas. It will be necessary to 
connect our study with other surveys covering larger samples. In addition, our research on Abunzi has 
just begun and it should be continued to bring more convincing results. 
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要約 
 
 紛争はしばしば大量の難民の流出入を引き起こす。帰還した難民にどのように土地
を配分するかは、政治的に大きな問題となる。本稿では、ルワンダ内戦による土地所
有の変化とその背景について、フィールドワークで得られたデータに基づき分析した。
ルワンダでは、1994 年の内戦と虐殺に伴い、大量の難民の流出入があった。内戦に勝
利した「ルワンダ愛国戦線」（RPF）は、1962 年の独立前後に流出した難民の第二世代
を中核とし、そのエスニック集団は主に少数派のトゥチであった。RPF が政権を樹立
すると、旧政権の政治指導者は多数派エスニック集団フトゥの一般市民を引き連れ、
周辺国に逃れた。入れ替わりに、RPF と同じ政治的背景を持つ、大量のトゥチ難民が
ルワンダに帰還した。帰還したトゥチ難民の多くは、難民となって逃れたフトゥ農民
の所有地を利用し、生活を始めた。フトゥ難民の多くは 1996～97 年に帰還したが、政
府当局はその時、1994 年以来彼らの所有地を使用しているトゥチ帰還民との間で土地
を折半し、半分を移譲させた。内戦後のルワンダで、トゥチ帰還民に対する土地分配
に極めてラジカルな政策がとられた理由として、RPF が武力で内戦に勝利したこと、
そしてトゥチ帰還民が RPF と同じ政治的背景を持つことが指摘できる。今日まで、RPF
が主導する政権は安定しており、土地分割に対する目立った抵抗運動は生じていない。
しかし、土地分割を余儀なくされた住民に不満がないとは考えにくく、トゥチ難民が
新たに獲得した土地の所有権は RPF 政権の安定性によって政治的に担保されているに
過ぎない。ルワンダの歴史を振り返ると、政治権力による土地所有への介入が繰り返
され、時に紛争に結びついてきた。土地所有権が安定するためには、民衆が政権の正
当性を認めることが不可欠であり、それを促す政策が必要である。 
 
